ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND
Integral attack was proposed as SQUARE attack [1] , and Knudsen et al. formalized it as integral attack [2] . The attacker can recover the secret key by exploiting integral distinguisher which is obtained by 2 n chosen plaintexts, where n must be less than the block length M (n < M). A set of chosen plaintexts is encrypted for multiple rounds to make a set of outputs and we compute integration (XOR summation) of the set. If there exist a bit whose integrated value is constant for any secret key, we can define integral distinguisher.
Conventionally, we exploit two characteristics to construct integral distinguisher. One characteristic is based on algebraic degrees of boolean functions [3] , and the other is on bijective functions inside the cipher function [2] . Recently, To do proposed an algorithm to construct integral distinguisher by division property [4] which can exploit both characteristics. Using division property, full-round integral attack on MISTY1 was announced in CRYPTO2015 [5] .
By overestimating algebraic degrees of nonlinear functions, the algorithm can effectively con struct integral distinguisher. Owing to the overestimation, however, it is impossible to deny integral distinguisher in additional rounds [6] . For example, algebraic degrees of all output bits of S-box are regarded as 3 in PRESENT, though there is an output bit which has a degree 2. Division property can obtain 6-round integral distinguisher [4] , however, Wu et al. showed 7-round integral distinguisher using the fact [7] . Because of the output bit with degree 2, the algebraic degree increases unevenly when a round function of PRESENT is iterated [7] . Also in SIMON family [8] , there is the same problem. In SIMON32, there is a gap between integral distinguisher constructed by division property [4] and one experimentally constructed in [9] .
In order to solve the problem, the same author proposed similar algorithm using bit-based division property, and applied it to SIMON family [6] . As for SIMON32 (32-bit block cipher), the algorithm succeeded to construct the same integral distinguisher of [6] . However, it can not be applied if the block length is large since time and memory complexity increases in exponential order with the block length. Because of the complexity, it can not be applied to SIMON48.
Aside from division property, Perrin et al. proposed high-degree indicator matrix (HDIM) which can be used to search for integral distinguisher [10] in FSE2016. This is experimental method whose time and memory complexity increases in exponential order with the block length. Therefore, it is infeasible to compute HDIM when the block length is large as well as bit-based division property. They showed the existence of some patterns in the HDIM which holds any Feistel structure, however, their application is restricted.
In spite of remarkable advances in this research field, the feasible algorithm to obtain supremum integral distinguisher is still an open problem. Note that we define supremum integral distinguisher as γ-round integral distinguisher such that no (γ + 1)-round one can be constructed.
CONTRIBUTION
As a new solution, we propose an algorithm taking following three approaches.
(i) We focus on analyzing integral distinguisher which we cannot construct.We define such integral distinguisher as upper-bound integral distinguisher. Using it, we can obtain the number of rounds which integral attack is invalid. As we can construct integral distinguisher in additional rounds by increasing the number of chosen plaintexts [2] , we consider integral distinguisher which is obtained by the maximum number of chosen plaintexts. It is 2 M−1 (n = M − 1) in M-bit block cipher.
(ii) In order to achieve the objective of (i), we search for intermediate bits whose integrated values change depending on the secret key. We define such bits as unbalanced bits. We regard each intermediate bit as a boolean function expressed by the algebraic normal form (ANF). If there is a term in the ANF such that its degree is n and its coefficient changes depending on the secret key, the bit is unbalanced bit. We aim to show the existence of such a term in the ANF. We propose term-expression set and term-expression chain to express any term in the ANF effectively. By expressing terms, we can check their degrees and coefficients.
(iii) Since the number of all terms increases in exponential order with the number of variables and rounds, we limit the number of terms we check depending on the computer environments. In order to search the terms explained in (ii), we propose a randomized algorithm to determine whether the bit is unbalanced or not. When we apply the proposal algorithm to all M output bits in γ-th round, we can determine if we can construct γ-round integral distinguisher or not. If we cannot construct it, upper-bound integral distinguisher is γ-round one. number of terms.
We demonstrate the proposal algorithm in two 64-bit block ciphers PRESENT [11] and RECTANGLE [12] . As a result, we find that all bits in 8th round of PRESENT and 9th round of RECTANGLE are unbalanced bits. Therefore, upper-bound integral distinguisher is 8-round and 9-round integral distinguisher, respectively. In other word, there is a possibility that the attacker can construct 7-round and 8-round integral distinguisher, respectively. Using the most effective key-recovery technique for these two ciphers proposed by Zhang et al. [13] , we estimate the number of rounds in which integral attack is invalid. Then, we confirm that it is infeasible to attack more than 11-round of PRESENT and 13-round of RECTANGLE. Hence, we conclude that full-round PRESENT (31-round ) and RECTANGLE (25-round) are secure enough for integral attack.
Conventionally, we show the number of rounds we can attack to determine the security margin. Our approach is different from the concept. We aim to show the maximum number of rounds we cannot attack. The parameter is more effective to determine the security margin. To obtain the parameter, the algorithm obtain upper-bound integral distinguisher by estimating algebraic degrees.
PRELIMINARIES
ALGEBRAIC NORMAL FORM
PRESENT AND RECTANGLE
Also, one of RECTANGLE is: 
INTEGRAL DISTINGUISHER
If an integrated value is constant for all K, we can define -round integral distinguisher. Since our focus is only on integral distinguisher, see [14] and [13] for techniques to recover round-key values.
BALANCED / UNBALANCED BIT
We introduce following three cases related to Eq.(5).
RELATED WORKS
We show three works related to integral distinguisher, division property [4] , bit-based division property [6] and HDIM [10] . These three works have similarity with our method, since they use the ANF and estimate algebraic degree to construct integral distinguisher. We use three cases shown in Sec.2.4 for clarifying objectives of these works.
DIVISION PROPERTY [4]
The major difference between division property and bit-based division property [6] is in the way to regard M-bit block. The former assumes it is composed of l m-bit words (M = l _ m), and the latter simply assumes it is composed of M bits. Generally, m-bit words are defined by nonlinear function such as S-box. We construct integral distinguisher in word unit by using division property. Specifically, we can determine all bits of each word are in case 1 or not exploiting the structure of round function. The structure is used in the propagation rule of division property, and division property holds independently of round-key and constant values in K. The objectives of division property (bit-based division property) and HDIM differ in this point.
In [4] , the author shows some rules for propagation of division property in iteration of a round function. Especially in m-bit non-linear function, we need to assume that all output bits have the same algebraic degree, since we consider the propagation in word unit. We assume that all output degree is overestimated, otherwise, Eq.(6) does not hold, since algebraic degree of bit product is underestimated. As mentioned in Sec.1, it is impossible to construct 7-round integral distinguisher by using division property from the above.
BIT-BASED DIVISION PROPERTY [6]
The way to estimate complexity to compute bit-based division property has not yet been clarified. However, it needs much more complexity than the conventional division property. The complexity of bit-based division property increases depending on the block length M. Therefore, the authors only show integral distinguisher of SIMON32 (32-bit block length).
HIGH-DEGREE INDICATOR MATRIX [10]
In order to compute HDIM, it needs M *2 M-1 times encryption, and it is infeasible when M is large. Also such computation should be repeated by changing the value of K adequate number of times to conform integral distinguisher [9] . As a feasible technique, the existence of some patterns in the HDIM of Feistel structures is shown. However, the pattern cannot deny the existence of integral distinguisher which holds in additional rounds. Also for other structures, we still have to compute Eq. (8) . Therefore, application of HDIM is highly restricted.
NEW METHOD TO EXPRESS TERMS
Generally, the ANF of single round function is easily obtained, however, it is difficult to obtain the ANF after some round iteration. From plaintext side to ciphertext side, the ANF is obtained by repetition of substitution and expansion of polynomials. We call this method straightforward method. If we can execute straightforward method, we can express the coefficient aIN as an AND product of round-key values K and constant bits C in K. Since it is infeasible when the number of rounds is large, we take another approach for the same objective.
TERM-EXPRESSION SET AND TERM-EXPRESSION CHAIN
We express p0 using n variable bits X in plaintext X 0 (see Sec.2.3). Then, Eq. (14) is rewritten as 
CONSIDERATION OF BIJECTIVE FUNCTIONS
RANDOMIZED ALGORITHM FOR ALGEBRAIC DEGREE ESTIMATION
By using the method shown in Sec.4, we can uniquely express a term in the ANF. Since the number of all possible ways to define term-expression chain J1 equals one obtained in straightforward method, the complexity to check all the terms is easily estimated. We show the way based on straightforward method. As mentioned in Sec.4, the number of terms increases by the iteration of round function. Note that we do not consider combination of coefficients with the same monomial 
SEARCH SPACE REDUCTION
DISCUSSION
From the results shown in Sec.7.2, we estimate the number of rounds which integral attack is Table 2 : Results on PRESENT And RECTANGLE. 
CONCLUSION
We propose the randomized algorithm for algebraic degree estimation in order to obtain upperbound integral distinguisher. By demonstrating the algorithms in PRESENT and RECTANGLE, we confirm that 8-and 9-round integral distinguisher can not be constructed, respectively. From these facts, we confirm that integral attacks for 11-round PRESENT and 13-round RECTANGLE are invalid. Hence, we conclude that both ciphers are secure enough for integral attack considering the specifications of the number of rounds. The upper bound integral distinguisher helps designers to decide security margin. The proposal algorithms enables them to obtain such security parameter by algebraic degree estimation.
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